Shahed-136 Specs, Range, Warhead and Geran-2 Variants

The Shahed-136, an Iranian delta-wing one-way attack drone reported to carry a 30 to 50 kg warhead, has become the most widely used long-range strike drone in modern war, produced in Russia as the Geran-2. Its appeal is cost, a price estimated in the tens of thousands of dollars, and sheer numbers.

~2,000 km

Claimed maximum range, manufacturer claims

30-50 kg

Warhead, reported

~185 km/h

Cruise speed, claimed

$20-50K

Estimated unit cost

What is the Shahed-136

The Shahed-136 is a propeller-driven loitering munition with a tailless delta wing, built by Iran’s Shahed Aviation Industries for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It flies a pre-programmed route to GPS coordinates and dives into its target. It is sometimes grouped with loitering munitions, although it has no operator-in-the-loop loitering phase in its basic form.

Iran showed the design in public around 2021 and used variants with Houthi forces in Yemen. Russia began launching it against Ukraine in September 2022 and later built its own copies at the Alabuga plant in Tatarstan. Our Bayraktar TB2 vs Shahed-136 comparison covers how the two very different drones shaped the war.

Shahed-136 specifications

Parameter	Value	Status
Length	About 3.5 m	Reported
Wingspan	About 2.5 m	Reported
Launch weight	About 200 kg	Reported
Warhead	30 to 50 kg high explosive	Reported
Engine	Small piston engine, roughly 50 hp, pusher propeller	Reported
Cruise speed	About 185 km/h	Manufacturer claims
Range	Up to about 2,000 km	Manufacturer claims
Guidance	Satellite navigation with inertial backup; later versions add camera and modem links	Reported
Launch	Rail-mounted rocket booster from a truck or fixed rack	Reported

Iranian and Russian performance figures are manufacturer claims or come from state media and are not independently verified. Physical data comes from recovered airframes.

Wreckage analysis has shown that the drone contains mostly commercial parts, including Western-made microelectronics and a piston engine closely based on a German light-aircraft design. That is why sanctions and supply-chain controls matter to its production.

Shahed-136 vs Geran-2

The Russian Geran-2 is essentially the Shahed-136 with Russian assembly and, increasingly, domestic components. Russia reportedly localized most airframe production at Alabuga and has added cameras, cellular modems for mid-course updates, and in some versions thermobaric or fragmentation warheads. A jet-powered variant, Geran-3, was shown in 2025 and is said by Russian sources to fly faster, a claim not confirmed independently.

Shahed-136 and Geran-2 differences

Feature	Shahed-136 (Iran)	Geran-2 (Russia)
Production	Iran	Alabuga, Tatarstan, plus Iranian-built lots early on
Navigation	Satellite navigation, inertial	Adds jam-resistant antennas, modem updates
Payload options	Blast-fragmentation warhead	Adds alternative warheads, reported
Decoys	Not standard	Decoy airframes without warheads reported

Reported configurations; production details change often.

Beyond Iran and Russia, the drone family has been associated with the Houthis in Yemen and with other groups supplied by Tehran, and Iranian forces used Shahed-series drones in large salvos against targets in the Middle East in 2024. Related Iranian designs include the Shahed-131, a smaller sibling, and the Shahed-238, a jet-powered development, although the performance data for both come from Iranian statements and remain unverified.

How effective is the Shahed-136

Its strength is economics. Ukrainian air defenses have to spend interceptors, guns or fighters to stop drones that cost far less. Ukraine’s air force has reported intercepting a large majority of launched drones in many months, often above 80 percent, figures that are operator-reported and do not account for damage from those that got through. Russia launched thousands per month at times, which saturates defenses and lets missiles follow.

Shaheds have hit power stations, apartment blocks and ports, and their use in salvos of dozens or hundreds is now routine. Their basic weakness is slow speed, a loud engine and predictable flight paths, which is why cheap counters work at scale. Russian officials and state media portray the Geran-2 as highly effective, a claim that mixes real damage with propaganda value, so independent damage assessments matter more than either side’s headline numbers.

How to counter Shahed drones

Ukraine developed a layered defense with mobile fire teams, radars, acoustic sensors, interceptor drones, and former air-defense guns such as the Gepard self-propelled gun. Electronic warfare can also push a drone off course. Western militaries are studying cheaper interceptors, including counter-UAS missiles and laser systems, because spending a $1 million missile on a $30,000 drone is unsustainable.

Editor’s read

The Shahed story is about mass production, not technology. A simple, cheap airframe made by the thousands forced air-defense planners everywhere to rethink cost exchange ratios, and every major army now wants its own version.