Sudan Accuses Ethiopia of Hosting Drone Launch Sites in UN Complaint
Sudan Accuses Ethiopia of Hosting Drone Launch Sites in UN Complaint
Sudan’s military-led government filed formal complaints with the United Nations Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on November 1, 2026, accusing Ethiopia of allowing its territory to be used as a launch base for drones that have struck Sudan’s electricity grid. The complaint names specific Ethiopian sites, including Asosa airport and the Bahir Dar air base, and ties them to a weeks-long campaign of one-way attack drone strikes that Sudan’s government blames on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and says are supplied by the United Arab Emirates. Ethiopia has rejected the accusation and counter-accused Sudan’s army of backing Tigrayan armed groups. Neither government’s claims have been independently verified.
What Happened
In a statement issued late on November 1, Sudan’s foreign ministry said the RSF had used Ethiopian territory to launch “brazen aggression” against Sudanese power infrastructure and civilian sites, and argued the conduct breaches Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which bars the use of force against another state’s territorial integrity. The complaint followed an intensifying drone campaign against the national grid: Emergency Lawyers, a Sudanese rights group that tracks the strikes, counted at least 15 substations hit since early October, and Al Jazeera reported the tally had reached 18 reported strikes on the electricity network in the week leading up to November 2.
Among the facilities hit: substations at Abu Hamad (River Nile State) and Al-Dabbah (Northern State) on November 1; the Um Dabakir thermal power station in White Nile State, the country’s largest thermal plant at 500 megawatts, which was shut down; transformers destroyed at the Shendi substation in River Nile State; a strike on the still-under-construction Haya substation in Red Sea State; and, on November 2, the New Halfa and Aroma substations in Kassala state plus the al-Ghazali substation in Northern State. The Merowe Dam, Sudan’s largest hydropower source, now supplies more than 70 percent of national electricity, according to a Sudan Electric Holding Company employee cited by the Soufan Center, making it and the surrounding grid an outsized target.
Sudan’s army-led Transitional Sovereignty Council put the broader campaign at 70 attacks involving 187 one-way attack drones between February 15 and October 27, which it says killed or wounded 484 civilians and killed 176 soldiers while wounding roughly 200 more. These figures come from the Sudanese government side of the conflict and have not been independently verified.
The Allegation: Ethiopian Launch Sites
Sudan’s defense ministry named three locations it says were used to launch the drones: Asosa airport in western Ethiopia, the Kurmuk and Gizen border area, and the Bahir Dar air base in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. Officials said data extracted from recovered drone wreckage and satellite imagery pointed to launch coordinates inside Ethiopian territory. None of this technical evidence has been made public or independently reviewed by a third party, and the attribution should be treated as an allegation by one party to an active civil war, not an established fact.
Ethiopia has denied the accusation and responded by accusing Sudan’s army of supporting Tigrayan armed groups, a claim Khartoum denies. As of this writing, Ethiopia had not formally responded to the November 1 complaint at the UN, and no date had been set for the Security Council or the AU Peace and Security Council to take it up.
The Product/System: One-Way Attack Drones
Neither Sudan’s government nor independent reporting has confirmed the specific drone model used in the power-grid campaign. Sudan’s own report refers generically to “one-way attack drones,” the standard term for low-cost, non-recoverable loitering munitions that fly a one-time attack profile into a target, similar in concept to the Iranian-designed Shahed-136. Earlier in the war, researchers including Aberfoyle Security documented RSF use of Sunflower-200 drones, a Chinese-made derivative of the Shahed-136 design, alongside drones and other weapons the RSF is reported to have received via the UAE. Whether the Sunflower-200 or another type was used against the grid specifically has not been confirmed by wreckage analysis or other open-source verification in the reporting reviewed for this article.
Al Jazeera cited a regional security analyst describing the drones involved in the power-grid campaign only as having “long range and high destructive power,” without identifying a specific platform. One account of the November attacks noted a drone carrying four munitions destroyed transformers at the Shendi substation, a detail about payload rather than confirmed aircraft type.
Who Uses It
Sudan’s government and Emergency Lawyers attribute the power-grid strikes to the RSF, the paramilitary force that has fought Sudan’s army since April 2023. The RSF has not publicly claimed the recent substation strikes and has in the past denied carrying out drone attacks on infrastructure. Confidence in this attribution should be treated as moderate: it rests on Sudanese government and allied rights-group sources rather than independent forensic confirmation, though it is consistent with the RSF’s established pattern of drone strikes on army-held infrastructure earlier in the war.
Export/Procurement History
The UAE has repeatedly and publicly denied arming the RSF, despite recurring allegations from Sudan’s government, UN panels, and independent researchers over the course of the war. A UN fact-finding mission has previously examined foreign drone transfers reaching the RSF; this latest complaint adds Ethiopian territory as an alleged transit and launch point, a new wrinkle that regional diplomats have not yet addressed in public. No contract, shipment manifest, or other primary document has been published to substantiate either the UAE-origin claim or the Ethiopian-launch claim; both currently rest on the Sudanese government’s own investigative report to the UN and AU.
Why It Matters
Beyond the immediate damage, sustained strikes on substations and thermal plants threaten water pumping and treatment systems, hospitals and blood banks dependent on cold storage, and irrigation for Sudan’s winter growing season at a time when millions already face acute food insecurity, the Soufan Center noted in a November 4 assessment. The UN Charter framing of the complaint, treating drone strikes launched from a neighboring state’s territory as a breach of Sudan’s territorial integrity, sets a notable precedent for how African governments are beginning to frame cross-border drone warfare in international forums, even though the underlying facts remain contested. The episode also illustrates how a widely used but rarely named weapons category, the one-way attack drone, continues to shape the conflict’s trajectory while attribution and sourcing remain murky.
The dispute adds a new strain to Sudan-Ethiopia relations at a moment when both countries are already managing other regional friction, including Ethiopia’s internal tensions with Tigray. It also complicates international diplomacy on Sudan: the Quad grouping of the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE has been pushing a parallel diplomatic track, and the UN has been planning talks with the RSF and its allies, reportedly before the end of the year, aimed at a transition to civilian rule rather than an immediate ceasefire.
What Happens Next
The UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council have not announced when, or whether, they will formally take up Sudan’s complaint. Ethiopia has not filed a substantive public response beyond its denial and counter-accusation. Absent independent verification of the drone wreckage and satellite evidence Sudan says it possesses, the diplomatic complaint is likely to remain a war of narratives in international forums rather than produce a swift resolution. Meanwhile, Emergency Lawyers and other monitors are continuing to track strikes on the power grid, with additional substations hit as recently as November 2.
FAQ
What did Sudan ask the UN to do?
Sudan’s foreign ministry asked the UN Security Council and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council to take up its complaint that Ethiopia allowed its territory to be used to launch drone strikes on Sudanese infrastructure, which Khartoum argues breaches the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force against another state’s territory. No council action has been announced.
What drones were used in the strikes on Sudan’s power grid?
No drone model has been independently confirmed for the recent substation strikes. Sudan’s own report describes them generically as one-way attack drones. Earlier in the war, researchers documented RSF use of the Chinese-made Sunflower-200, a derivative of Iran’s Shahed-136 loitering munition.
Does the UAE supply drones to the RSF?
Sudan’s government alleges the drones used against the power grid are UAE-supplied. The UAE has repeatedly denied arming the RSF. UN panels and independent researchers have examined foreign drone transfers to the RSF in the past, but no primary document has been published confirming this specific allegation.
How has Ethiopia responded?
Ethiopia denies hosting drone launch sites and has counter-accused Sudan’s army of backing Tigrayan armed groups, which Khartoum denies. Ethiopia had not filed a formal response to the UN complaint as of this writing.
How much of Sudan’s power grid has been affected?
Monitors including Emergency Lawyers counted at least 15 substations struck since early October 2026, with Al Jazeera reporting 18 reported strikes on the network in the week before November 2. Affected sites include substations in River Nile, Northern, White Nile, Red Sea and Kassala states, and the Um Dabakir thermal plant, Sudan’s largest, was shut down.
Sources
- Al Jazeera Staff and Anadolu, “Drone attacks extend campaign targeting Sudan’s power system,” Al Jazeera, November 2, 2026 — facility-level strike details and army/RSF defection context. aljazeera.com
- The Soufan Center, “Sudan’s Expanding Drone War and the Uncertain Prospects for Peace,” IntelBrief, November 4, 2026 — aggregate drone-attack statistics, named launch sites, humanitarian and diplomatic analysis. thesoufancenter.org
- allAfrica.com, “Sudan Lodges Formal Complaints Against Ethiopia With UNSC, AU Peace and Security Council,” November 4, 2026 — confirmation of the UN/AU filing. allafrica.com
- Sudan Tribune, “Sudan accuses Ethiopia of facilitating drone strikes on infrastructure,” November 1, 2026 — foreign ministry statement details. sudantribune.com
- The New Arab, “Sudan accuses Ethiopia over drone attacks amid fresh strikes,” November 2026 — Ethiopia’s denial and counter-accusation. newarab.com
- Associated Press via US News, “Sudan’s power grid nears collapse as drone strikes blamed on RSF target electric stations,” November 1, 2026 — Emergency Lawyers’ substation count and grid-collapse framing. usnews.com
- Aberfoyle Security, “Drones Over the Nile: Unmanned Aerial Warfare and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces,” analysis — background on RSF drone inventory including the Sunflower-200. aberfoylesecurity.com
