M23 Fields a Fourth New Drone Type in Eastern DRC as UAV Attacks Double

M23 rebels in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have introduced a fourth new type of unmanned aerial vehicle since January 2026, according to open-source analysis by Janes, as drone strikes account for a rapidly growing share of the armed group’s attacks on Congolese forces. The latest addition, a large quadcopter capable of dropping mortar bombs, was reportedly downed near Minembwe on September 28. Janes could not positively identify three of the four platforms, underlining how commercially available drone components are reshaping a conflict that has already drawn in Rwandan and Ugandan forces and is under active United Nations sanctions scrutiny.

What Happened

In a defense-intelligence assessment published October 2, Janes said it has tracked four previously unseen drone types entering M23’s arsenal over roughly nine months, each identified through geolocated photos and video posted by local militias, journalists, and the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) rather than through official confirmation. Janes judged the accounts “probably true” based on standard verification checks but could not independently confirm most of the claims, since in several cases the only available source was a single social media post.

The group recorded 13 drone attacks between July and September, which Janes said accounts for half of all M23 UAV attacks logged since January. Drones made up roughly 10 percent of the group’s recorded attacks in that quarter, up from about 5 percent in the first half of 2026. Janes’ geospatial review found drone use in every area where M23 has engaged FARDC in recent months, including Minembwe, Masisi, and Pinga in North and South Kivu provinces.

The Drones Involved

Janes lists four distinct platforms:

• A Baykar Sivrisinek-type loitering munition, which Janes says M23 first used in January 2026. Janes links this weapon to the YIHA-III, a one-way-attack UAV jointly developed by Turkey’s Baykar and Pakistan’s National Aerospace Science and Technology Park (NASTP), publicly unveiled by Baykar at the SAHA 2026 exhibition in Istanbul. FARDC claimed on social media to have shot down two of these munitions near Mikenge in March, which Janes assessed were “almost certainly” the same type, though it could not independently verify the FARDC account.
• A delta-wing jet-powered UAV, roughly 2 meters in wingspan and 2.5 meters long, that Rwanda-based outlet Umuseke reported was downed by FARDC near Minembwe on August 20. Janes said its profile “resembled a scaled-down Shahed-136,” but the nose section was missing from the wreckage photos, so its payload and origin remain unconfirmed.
• A large hexacopter with three external mounting points, photographed carrying two 60mm mortar bombs, which DRC-based outlet TazamaRDC reported was downed by Wazalendo militia fighters near Masisi on August 29.
• A large quadcopter with an underside plate and an electrically actuated release mechanism for munitions, filmed near Minembwe on September 28. The video’s poster claimed the aircraft belonged to Rwanda’s Defence Force, an allegation Janes could not verify from the footage alone.

Janes was unable to positively identify the delta-wing aircraft, the hexacopter, or the quadcopter, noting that commercially available drone components used by hobbyists and small manufacturers worldwide make precise attribution difficult from photos and video alone. Only the Sivrisinek-type munition carries a documented manufacturer link.

Who Is Flying What

No government or manufacturer has confirmed supplying any of these systems to M23 directly. Baykar has not commented publicly on the presence of Sivrisinek-type munitions in eastern Congo, and the September 28 quadcopter footage’s claim of Rwandan military ownership has not been independently corroborated. M23 itself has not claimed responsibility for specific platforms in its public statements reviewed by Janes.

The ambiguity is consistent with years of United Nations reporting on the conflict. UN Group of Experts assessments covering 2023 through 2026 have documented M23’s acquisition of GPS-jamming equipment, self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems, and GPS-guided mortar munitions, and a 2024 UN report accused Rwanda of supplying advanced weaponry to the group, including drone-borne mortar systems that damaged a Congolese aircraft. Rwanda has previously denied arming M23 directly while acknowledging troop involvement in the region; Uganda has denied separate allegations of support.

Export and Procurement Background

The Sivrisinek/YIHA-III line has a documented export history that predates its appearance in Congo. Pakistan reportedly employed the type during its May 2025 conflict with India, and unverified Pakistani and Indian reporting has disputed its reliability in that engagement. How any units reached non-state forces in eastern DRC, if the identification holds, is not addressed in the Janes assessment or in any official statement found by Defense & Tech. Turkey has separately expanded defense-industrial ties across Africa in recent years, including drone sales to multiple governments on the continent, but no link between those government-to-government programs and M23’s inventory has been established.

The other three platforms identified by Janes rely on components available on the commercial market, a pattern consistent with broader reporting on drone proliferation among non-state armed groups in Africa, where modified commercial multirotors and fixed-wing airframes have increasingly been adapted to drop mortar rounds or small munitions.

Why It Matters

Janes assessed that M23 poses a high threat to stability in eastern DRC, citing its record of defeating FARDC in ground engagements since its 2022 resurgence, and judged the threat likely to keep rising over the next one to six months, driven primarily by the group’s expanding drone capability. The group’s internal leadership divisions over its long-term political aims partly offset that assessment, according to Janes, which lists territorial losses, leadership attrition, or a shift toward purely local grievances as indicators that could point the other way.

The case also illustrates a wider problem for arms-control monitors: distinguishing between battlefield claims made by combatants and militias on social media, commercially sourced hardware repurposed for combat, and confirmed state-supplied systems. Only one of the four systems Janes tracked carries a traceable manufacturer link, and even that identification rests on a visual resemblance assessed by analysts rather than a recovered serial number or official confirmation.

What Happens Next

Janes said it will continue monitoring for additional UAV sightings and attack reporting as the conflict continues. A fresh UN Group of Experts report on the DRC, which has in past cycles examined arms flows to M23 in detail, would be the most likely venue for an authoritative assessment of where the group’s drones originate. Until then, claims about individual platforms—including their ownership, origin, and operators—should be treated as unverified pending independent confirmation.

FAQ

What new drone did M23 use most recently?

A large quadcopter with a munition-release mechanism, reportedly downed by Wazalendo militia fighters near Minembwe on September 28, 2026. Its ownership and origin have not been independently confirmed.

Has any government confirmed supplying drones to M23?

No. Rwanda has previously denied directly arming M23, and Uganda has denied separate support allegations. No manufacturer, including Baykar, has commented on the presence of its systems in the conflict.

What is the Baykar Sivrisinek and why does it matter here?

It is a loitering munition jointly developed by Turkey’s Baykar and Pakistan’s NASTP, linked earlier to the designation YIHA-III. Janes assesses that M23 began using a system resembling it in January 2026, making it the only one of the four newly tracked platforms with a documented manufacturer lineage.

How much has drone use grown in the conflict?

Janes recorded 13 drone attacks by M23 between July and September 2026, representing about 10 percent of the group’s attacks that quarter, up from roughly 5 percent in the first half of the year.

Is this the first time drones have been reported in the DRC conflict?

No. UN Group of Experts reports from 2023 onward have documented M23’s use of GPS-guided munitions and air-defense systems, and separate reporting has described Rwanda-linked forces and Congolese government forces both employing drones, including Bayraktar TB2s, in the same conflict.

Sources

• Janes, “New M23 UAV increase threat to DRC stability,” October 2, 2026 — primary source for the four UAV identifications, attack statistics, and threat assessment.
• Janes, “DRC: Armed downing of M23 loitering munition indication of future use,” 2026 — source for the March 10 Mikenge downing claim and Sivrisinek/YIHA-III linkage.
• Janes, “Baykar displays previously little-known one-way attack UAV,” 2026 — background on the Sivrisinek’s public unveiling and its YIHA-III designation history.
• Baykar, official Sivrisinek product and press pages, baykartech.com — manufacturer specifications and SAHA 2026 unveiling details.
• Wikipedia, “YIHA-III” and “National Aerospace Science & Technology Park” — background on the Baykar-NASTP joint development history.
• Defense & Tech reporting, “TB2 Drones Reportedly Used in Rwanda-Backed DR Congo Strikes,” September 10, 2026 — prior reporting on drone use by other parties to the same conflict.