UN Report Finds Pakistan Breached Libya Arms Embargo

A United Nations Panel of Experts has formally determined that Pakistan violated the Security Council’s Libya arms embargo, after a Pakistani government representative presented weapons fitted with “Eye” sighting systems to the top two commanders of the Haftar-aligned Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) during a visit to Benghazi in December 2025. The finding appears in the Panel’s final 2026 report on Libya, obtained and reviewed for this article, and has drawn little international attention even as Islamabad separately negotiates a much larger, multibillion-dollar fighter jet package with the same LAAF leadership.

What Happened

According to the Panel of Experts on Libya, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), a government representative of Pakistan visited Benghazi on 18 December 2025 and presented at least two weapons equipped with “Eye” systems to the LAAF’s commander-in-chief, Khalifa Haftar, and deputy commander-in-chief, Saddam Haftar. The Panel documented the presentation using photographs posted the same day to official LAAF-linked Facebook accounts.

The Panel wrote that it requested further information from both Pakistan and the LAAF about the transfer. Neither replied. It concluded that “the Eye system is military equipment,” and that the transfer of both the sighting system and the weapon it was mounted on “constituted violations of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Pakistan” — the clause barring the supply of arms and military equipment to Libya without approval from the Security Council’s sanctions committee.

The finding sits in Table 3 of the report, a summary of states, entities and individuals the Panel found in violation of, or non-compliant with, the embargo. Pakistan is listed there alongside Belarus (training assistance to the LAAF), Egypt (aviation assistance) and Türkiye (a maritime transfer violation), among others. The report, formally numbered S/2026/224, was transmitted to the Security Council on 24 March 2026 after being delivered to the Libya Sanctions Committee on 19 February 2026.

The Product: POF Eye

The “Eye” system named in the report is commercially known as the POF Eye, a corner-shot-style accessory designed and produced by Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), the state-owned arms conglomerate at Wah Cantonment. The system pairs a camera with a fold-out side screen, letting its front section pivot roughly 90 degrees left or right so an operator can aim and fire around a corner without exposing their body. It can be mounted on a pistol, a compact submachine gun or a small grenade launcher.

POF has marketed the Eye system at international defense expos for more than a decade, including at IDEF in Istanbul, and it has been in Pakistani service since 2008. It is built for close-quarters and counter-terrorism use by police and special-operations units rather than conventional battlefield engagements, which makes its appearance in a Panel of Experts arms-embargo finding unusual: most violations cataloged in the same report involve far heavier hardware, from Turkish naval transfers to unidentified deliveries of Russian-origin armor and air-defense systems to the LAAF.

Who Uses It

Confirmed operator: Pakistan’s own security forces, which have fielded the POF Eye since its 2008 unveiling. The Panel’s report newly and officially adds the LAAF’s top command as a recipient, via the December 2025 Benghazi presentation, though as a one-off gift rather than a confirmed operational deployment. Pakistani officials have in the past shown export variants of the system to foreign delegations, including a reported 2015 visit by Malaysia’s army chief to POF facilities, without public confirmation that Malaysia adopted it.

Export History and the Larger Deal in the Background

The Benghazi gun-sight transfer did not happen in isolation. Reuters and multiple Pakistani and Libyan outlets reported in December 2025 and January 2026 that Pakistan and the LAAF were finalizing a far larger arms package — reportedly worth more than $4 billion, by some accounts up to $4.6 billion — centered on 16 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets and 12 Super Mushshak trainer aircraft, agreed after a meeting in Benghazi between Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Saddam Haftar. Pakistani officials told Reuters at the time that the package would not violate UN rules; Islamabad’s foreign and defense ministries did not respond to requests for comment on the deal itself.

The Panel’s report does not name the fighter jet package, and it is unclear from the public document whether that larger deal falls within the period the Panel examined or has advanced toward delivery. What the report does establish, on the Panel’s own evidentiary record, is that a Pakistani government representative transferred embargoed military equipment to the LAAF command structure during the same diplomatic track, roughly contemporaneous with the reported jet negotiations. That adds weight to the embargo question: it is no longer only a press-sourced allegation about Pakistan’s intentions in Libya, but a documented violation drawn from the state’s own visible conduct.

Global Context

Libya has been under a UN arms embargo since 2011, extended and tightened repeatedly, most recently under resolution 2769 (2025). The Panel’s 2026 report describes an increasingly crowded field of states and companies supplying both the LAAF in the east and Government of National Unity-aligned forces in the west, from Emirati-linked shipping and logistics firms to an Italian-seized shipment of what investigators assessed as Chinese Fei Long-1 drone components. Pakistan’s case is comparatively narrow in scope, but it marks Islamabad’s formal entry onto the Panel’s list of state violators — a list that also includes Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, albeit mostly for lesser non-compliance with information-sharing requirements rather than physical transfers.

Why It Matters

For Pakistan, the finding complicates a defense-export push that has recently expanded well beyond its traditional buyers. Islamabad has reported new or pending drone and light-aircraft deliveries to Sudan’s army and a proposed JF-17 sale to Somalia in recent weeks, alongside the Libya fighter jet talks — part of a broader strategy to diversify arms exports toward African and Middle Eastern markets as relations with longtime patron China deepen and ties with India remain frozen. A formal UN embargo violation, even one involving a comparatively minor weapon sight rather than fighter jets, creates a paper trail the Sanctions Committee can cite if it ever considers restricting the far larger JF-17 and Super Mushshak package.

For Libya, the episode underscores how thoroughly the decade-old embargo has eroded. The Panel’s own catalog of violations in the same report — Turkish maritime transfers, unidentified deliveries of Russian armor and air-defense systems, Egyptian aviation assistance — suggests that formal findings against individual states function more as a documentary record than as an active deterrent.

What Happens Next

The Security Council’s 1970 Committee considered the Panel’s report on 24 March 2026; the Panel’s mandate itself was renewed to August 2027 under resolution 2819, with an interim report due by 15 December 2026 and a further final report by 15 June 2027. Those future reports are the most likely venue for any update on whether the JF-17 and Super Mushshak package has moved toward delivery, and whether Pakistan or Libya ever sought a Sanctions Committee exemption for it, which neither side has publicly confirmed doing.

FAQ

What exactly did the UN find Pakistan did?

The Panel of Experts on Libya found that a Pakistani government representative presented at least two weapons fitted with POF Eye sighting systems to the LAAF’s top two commanders in Benghazi on 18 December 2025, and ruled this a violation of the Libya arms embargo under resolution 1970 (2011).

What is the POF Eye system?

It is a corner-shot-style weapon accessory made by Pakistan Ordnance Factories, combining a camera and a side-mounted screen so a shooter can fire around corners without exposing themselves. It has been in Pakistani service since 2008.

Is this related to Pakistan’s reported JF-17 deal with Libya?

The UN report does not name the separately reported $4 billion-plus JF-17 and Super Mushshak package. The embargo finding concerns only the December 2025 weapon-sight transfer, though both episodes stem from the same Pakistan-LAAF diplomatic track.

Has Pakistan responded to the finding?

Not publicly. The Panel says it requested further information from both Pakistan and the LAAF and received no reply from either.

Are other countries named in the same report?

Yes. The report also lists Belarus, Egypt, Italy and Türkiye as having violated or been non-compliant with the embargo, and names Russia, the UAE, the UK and the US in connection with lesser non-compliance findings.

Sources

• Panel of Experts on Libya, “Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya,” UN document S/2026/224, 24 March 2026 — primary source for the embargo violation finding, Table 3 and Annex 25.
• Reuters, “Pakistan strikes $4 billion deal to sell weapons to Libyan force, officials say,” reported via Arab News, late December 2025 — sourcing on the separate JF-17/Super Mushshak package.
• Global Sanctions, “UN Panel of Experts presents annual Libya sanctions report,” May 2026 — secondary summary noting the list of states found in breach.
• Minbar Libya, “Oil, militias, and illicit trafficking: this is how Libya is held together,” 12 April 2026 — reporting on the leaked draft ahead of the report’s release.
• Wikipedia, “POF Eye” — background on the weapon system’s design, manufacturer and service history.