Sudan Army Downs Chinese FH-95 Drone Over North Kordofan Again

Sudan Army Downs Chinese FH-95 Drone Over North Kordofan Again

Lead: Sudanese army air defenses shot down a Chinese-made FH-95 drone northeast of the Al-Kukaiti area in North Kordofan state on the morning of September 24, according to a Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) statement carried by Radio Tamazuj and Sudan Tribune. SAF said it was the second long-range drone its forces have intercepted over the greater Kordofan region in under a week, part of an intensifying pattern of drone warfare between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that has repeatedly put Chinese-designed unmanned aircraft, reportedly funneled to the RSF through third parties, at the center of Sudan’s 41-month civil war.

What Happened

SAF said its units “shot down a hostile FH-95 drone north-east of the Al-Kukaiti area in North Kordofan state” on the morning of September 24. Video circulated by army-aligned channels showed soldiers gathered around wreckage identified as the downed aircraft; the footage has not been independently verified, and RSF did not respond to requests for comment reported by regional outlets. North Kordofan has become one of the most contested fronts in Sudan’s war, as SAF and RSF units fight for control of roads and towns linking the central Nile heartland to RSF-held territory in Darfur and Kordofan’s west.

The interception follows a broader pattern SAF has documented since mid-2025: previous FH-95 downings were announced over Tawila in North Darfur, Tendelti in White Nile state, and Omdurman earlier this year. Independent of the aircraft themselves, the United Nations and monitoring groups such as ACLED have reported an intensifying RSF drone campaign against government-held towns in Kordofan in recent weeks, including a September 20 strike on a college in El-Obeid that killed a security guard and damaged classrooms, and reports of renewed strikes after a period in which RSF appeared to have scaled back drone use under international pressure. None of these broader casualty or campaign figures have been independently verified beyond the reporting of Sudan Tribune, the Associated Press and allied outlets tracking the conflict; SAF and RSF claims about each other’s drone losses and strikes should be treated as contested pending outside confirmation.

The FH-95 Drone System

The FH-95 is a medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aircraft built by Aerospace (Beijing) Times Feihong Technology Co., a UAV subsidiary of the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). It first appeared publicly at Airshow China in Zhuhai, where CASC marketed it primarily as an electronic-warfare and reconnaissance platform capable of jamming and signals collection, with manufacturer literature citing endurance beyond 20 hours and a service ceiling in the range of 12,000 meters. A closely related CASC design, the multirole Caihong (Rainbow) CH-95, is visually near-identical and is frequently conflated with the FH-95 in field reporting from Sudan; Sudanese military statements and open-source researchers have used both designations for what appears to be the same family of airframe, so precise identification of the exact variant operated by the RSF cannot be independently confirmed from the available imagery.

Neither CASC nor the Chinese government has published an official user list for the FH-95/CH-95 family, and Beijing has not commented on any aircraft of this type operating in Sudan.

Who Uses It

In Sudan, the FH-95/CH-95 has been operated exclusively by the RSF, a paramilitary force rather than a state air arm — an unusual profile for a Chinese medium-altitude drone typically marketed to government customers. SAF does not claim to operate the type itself; its statements describe FH-95s solely as aircraft it has shot down. No government has publicly confirmed operating the FH-95 as a recognized export customer, and China has not acknowledged any transfer, direct or indirect, that placed the aircraft in RSF hands.

The Supply Question: Export and Procurement History

How Chinese-built drones reached a non-state armed group remains one of the most disputed questions of the Sudan war. Open-source researchers, including Sudan analyst Eric Reeves, and reporting by Middle East Eye have alleged since 2023–2024 that the United Arab Emirates has supplied the RSF with FH-95/CH-95 drones as part of broader military support routed through Chad and, according to some accounts, Libya. The UAE has repeatedly and publicly denied arming the RSF, and no independent, on-the-record chain-of-custody evidence has been published tracing specific airframes from a CASC production line to an RSF unit. A UN Panel of Experts on Sudan has separately documented foreign-sourced weapons and drone components reaching the RSF without conclusively naming every supplying government. Given the absence of an official confirmation from Beijing, Abu Dhabi, or a neutral verification body, the UAE-to-RSF supply route should be treated as a credible but unconfirmed allegation, not an established fact.

Global Competitors and Countermeasures

SAF’s side of the drone war leans on a different supplier base. Turkish HİSAR-A air defense systems have surfaced in army-held territory to counter RSF drones and missiles, and open-source trackers have credited Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı UCAVs, reportedly operated on the army’s behalf, with air-to-air kills against RSF FH-95/CH-95 aircraft earlier in the conflict. The pattern mirrors a wider trend across African conflicts this year in which Chinese-made platforms — from CH-4 drones now based in Chad to Wing Loong variants elsewhere on the continent — are proliferating to both state militaries and, in Sudan’s unusual case, an armed non-state actor.

Why It Matters

The recurring FH-95/CH-95 downings underline how a Chinese-designed platform, whatever the true supply chain, has become one of the RSF’s signature strike and surveillance tools in a war the UN has linked to mass civilian casualties and one of the world’s largest displacement crises. For Beijing, unverified but persistent reporting that its export-grade drone technology is reaching a paramilitary force accused of war crimes raises end-use and re-export accountability questions that China has so far declined to publicly address. For Sudan’s military, each interception is presented as evidence of an improving air-defense picture over strategic corridors like North Kordofan, even as RSF’s broader drone campaign against frontline towns continues largely unabated.

What Happens Next

Fighting for control of North Kordofan’s supply routes is likely to continue in the near term, with both sides expected to keep contesting drone claims that cannot be independently verified in real time. Further scrutiny of the RSF’s drone supply chain is plausible if the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan or independent OSINT investigators publish additional findings, but no government implicated in the reporting has signaled it will change its position.

FAQ

What is the FH-95 drone?

The FH-95 is a Chinese medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aircraft built by CASC subsidiary Aerospace Times Feihong Technology, marketed for reconnaissance and electronic-warfare missions with reported endurance beyond 20 hours.

Who is flying FH-95 drones in Sudan?

Sudanese army statements attribute the aircraft it has repeatedly shot down to the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary group fighting Sudan’s military since April 2023. No government has confirmed operating or supplying the type in Sudan.

Is it confirmed that the UAE supplies these drones to the RSF?

No. Open-source researchers and outlets including Middle East Eye have alleged a UAE-linked supply route via Chad since 2023–2024, and a UN Panel of Experts has documented foreign-sourced drone components reaching the RSF, but the UAE denies arming the RSF and no official, verified chain of custody has been published.

Why is North Kordofan significant in Sudan’s war?

North Kordofan sits along supply routes linking central Sudan to RSF-held areas of Darfur and western Kordofan, making it a persistent flashpoint for ground fighting and drone strikes on both sides.

How is Sudan’s army countering RSF drones?

SAF has fielded Turkish HİSAR-A air defense systems and, according to open-source trackers, has used Bayraktar Akıncı UCAVs to intercept RSF drones, in addition to the ground-based air-defense intercepts announced this week.

Sources

  • Radio Tamazuj, “Sudan army says it shot down FH-95 drone in North Kordofan,” Sept. 24, 2026 — https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/sudan-army-says-it-shot-down-fh-95-drone-in-north-kordofan — primary account of the Sept. 24 SAF statement.
  • Sudan Tribune, “Sudan army downs drone in North Kordofan as RSF steps up abuses, sources say,” Sept. 24, 2026 — https://sudantribune.com/article/319198 — corroborates the incident and RSF drone campaign context.
  • Anadolu Agency (AA.com.tr), “Sudan’s army says it downed another FH-95 drone amid clashes with RSF,” July 14, 2026 — https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-s-army-says-it-downed-another-fh-95-drone-amid-clashes-with-rsf/3997092 — background on the recurring pattern of FH-95 interceptions.
  • SOFX, “Sudan Army Seizes RSF Drone Cache, Downs Two FH-95s Over North Kordofan” — https://www.sofx.com/sudan-army-seizes-rsf-drone-cache-downs-two-fh-95s-over-north-kordofan/ — additional detail on prior FH-95 incidents.
  • Middle East Eye, “UAE increasing support to Sudan’s RSF with new Chinese drones: Report” — https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-increasing-support-sudans-rsf-new-chinese-drones — sourcing for the disputed UAE supply allegation.
  • Military Africa, “(Special Report) Controversy surrounding the CH-95 drones in Sudan” — https://www.military.africa/2024/12/sudan-army-seize-rebels-ch-95-drone/ — background on CH-95/FH-95 identification issues.
  • Global Times, “FH-95 electronic warfare UAV to demonstrate cluster flight, long-range precise attack capabilities at Airshow China” — https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202411/1322770.shtml — manufacturer/state-media description of FH-95 capabilities.
  • U.S. News (Reuters), “Sudan’s RSF Steps up Deadly Drone Attacks on Frontline Cities,” Sept. 24, 2026 — https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-09-24/sudans-rsf-steps-up-deadly-drone-attacks-on-frontline-cities — broader RSF drone campaign context.

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