Russia Agreed to Arm Iran’s Mi-28 Helicopters, FT Reports
Lead
Leaked production records from Russian missile maker Vympel indicate that Moscow agreed in 2024 to supply Iran with 90 APU-L launcher pods built for the Mi-28 attack helicopter, the Financial Times reported on November 5, citing documents obtained by Ukrainian private intelligence firm Dallas Analytics. The APU-L is designed to carry the Izdeliye 305 precision-guided missile, also known as LMUR, which Russian forces have fired extensively against Ukrainian targets since 2022. Neither the Financial Times nor any outlet that has reviewed the documents has established whether the 90 launchers, or any accompanying missiles, were actually delivered to Iran, or whether Iranian crews have integrated them onto Iran’s Mi-28s.
What Happened
The documents reviewed by the Financial Times include a 2024–2025 production schedule attached to a May 2024 letter from Vympel to the Machine-Building Design Bureau (KBM), pressing KBM to speed up component deliveries. The schedule lists an order for 90 APU-L launchers against a customer coded “K-10.” The Financial Times said it had established that Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms-export monopoly, uses “K-10” to identify Iran in its internal paperwork — the same code that appears in earlier Rosoboronexport contracts covering Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft delivered to Tehran.
The report landed the same day a senior Iranian official visited the Kremlin to discuss expanding Russia–Iran defense ties. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, met Vladimir Putin on November 5 and delivered a letter from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that the Kremlin described as aimed at “further development of bilateral cooperation.” As Defense & Tech reported separately, that same letter reportedly asked Russia to supply S-400 air-defense systems — part of a broader Iranian push to rebuild air power degraded in last year’s war with Israel.
No Russian or Iranian official has commented on the APU-L order itself. Analysts quoted by the Financial Times describe Russia as deliberately opaque about the scale of its military-technical support for Tehran.
The Product: APU-L Launcher and the LMUR Missile
The APU-L is a twin-rail launcher pylon built for the Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopter family, carrying two missiles per pod; a related single-round variant, the APU-305, is also in Russian service. Both are built to fire the Izdeliye 305, commercially marketed as LMUR (“Light Multipurpose Guided Rocket”) — a man-in-the-loop, electro-optically guided air-to-surface missile that entered Russian service in 2022. According to the production documents cited by the Financial Times and Dallas Analytics, the missile travels at roughly 230 meters per second and can cover about 14 kilometers in under a minute, with the operator able to adjust its flight path toward moving or stationary targets after launch.
Both the launcher and missile are produced within Russia’s Tactical Missiles Corporation group, under the state conglomerate Rostec, which has been under Western sanctions since 2022. The LMUR has become one of the Russian Aerospace Forces’ primary stand-off strike weapons for Mi-28N/NM helicopters operating over Ukraine, letting crews engage armor and fortified positions from several kilometers outside the range of most short-range air defenses.
Who Uses It
The Russian Aerospace Forces are the confirmed operator of the APU-L/LMUR combination, employed routinely by Mi-28N and upgraded Mi-28NM helicopters in Ukraine. Iran’s status is far less certain. Iranian defense officials confirmed arrangements to acquire Mi-28 helicopters from Russia in November 2023, and photographs geolocated to an aviation facility in Tehran and published in January 2026 reportedly showed Mi-28s already present in the country. Whether those airframes are now fitted with APU-L launchers, whether any LMUR missiles have been transferred, and whether Iranian crews have trained on the system are all open questions that the leaked production schedule does not answer.
Export and Procurement History
The reported APU-L order sits inside a wider pattern of Russia–Iran defense dealings since the Ukraine war began, many of them announced or alleged well before any confirmed delivery. Iran supplied Shahed attack drones to Russia early in the war; Moscow later began building a domestic variant, the Geran, from that design. A May 2026 report said Russian military intelligence had planned to deliver roughly 5,000 drones to Iran, including jam-resistant fiber-optic types, though it remains unclear whether that shipment occurred. In February 2026, the Financial Times separately reported a secret €500 million Rosoboronexport contract to refurbish Iranian air defenses with 500 Verba portable launchers, 2,500 9M336 missiles and 500 Mowgli-2 night-vision sights, with deliveries scheduled for 2027–2029. In January 2025, Presidents Putin and Pezeshkian signed a 20-year strategic partnership treaty covering military-technical cooperation — though, unlike Russia’s pact with North Korea, it contains no mutual-defense clause.
More recently, an Iranian army spokesman said on October 31 that Tehran had completed payment and pilot training for Su-57 stablemate Su-35 fighters, but that delivery would wait until after the current war ends. Days later came the Khamenei letter requesting S-400 batteries. The APU-L report extends that same pattern to Iran’s rotary-wing fleet: repeated Russian commitments, largely unverified by independent delivery evidence.
Global Competitors
A functioning APU-L/LMUR fit would give Iran’s Mi-28s a rough analogue to the laser- and GPS-guided Hellfire and APKWS munitions that NATO attack helicopters carry, though Iran’s airframes, sensors and training pipeline remain far behind. Gulf operators of Western AH-64 Apaches and Bell AH-1Z Vipers already field longer-proven precision stand-off weapons, while China markets its own CM-502 and AKD-series missiles to helicopter export customers in Africa and Asia. For now, Iran’s most credible attack-helicopter precision-strike option remains aspirational rather than operational.
Why It Matters
The report undercuts US President Donald Trump’s October 13 assertion that Russia and China were doing “little, if anything” to help Iran militarily — a claim that reportedly contradicts US intelligence assessments. Hanna Notte, who directs the Eurasia program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told the Financial Times that Russian support for Iran is “operationally helpful” but not a “game changer,” and that Moscow continues to weigh its Iran relationship against wider ties to the US and other Middle Eastern states. Even unconfirmed, a 90-launcher order signals the direction Russia–Iran military cooperation is heading as Tehran works to rebuild air and rotary-wing capability degraded in last year’s war.
What Happens Next
Confirmation will likely depend on further leaked documentation, satellite or geolocated imagery of armed Iranian Mi-28s, or an on-the-record statement from Moscow or Tehran — none of which has surfaced so far. Western sanctions authorities may also scrutinize Vympel and KBM’s supply chains in light of the Dallas Analytics findings. The order is one more data point in Iran’s broader post-war rearmament push, alongside its pending Su-35 and requested S-400 deals, that will only become concrete once hardware — rather than paperwork — crosses the border.
FAQ
What is the APU-L launcher?
The APU-L is a Russian-made twin-rail pylon built for Mi-28 attack helicopters, designed to carry two Izdeliye 305 (LMUR) precision-guided missiles per launcher.
Has Russia confirmed delivering the launchers to Iran?
No. Leaked production documents show a 2024 order for 90 units linked to a Rosoboronexport customer code used for Iran, but the Financial Times says the paperwork does not establish whether the launchers were ever delivered.
What missile does the APU-L fire?
The Izdeliye 305, marketed as LMUR, a man-in-the-loop guided missile that entered Russian service in 2022 and has been used extensively against Ukraine.
Does Iran already have Mi-28 helicopters?
Iranian officials confirmed arrangements to acquire Mi-28s in November 2023, and images reportedly geolocated to a Tehran aviation facility and published in January 2026 appeared to show them in-country, though fleet size has not been officially disclosed.
How does this fit into wider Russia-Iran defense cooperation?
It follows a pattern of reported Russian commitments to Iran since 2022 — drones, an air-defense refurbishment package, Su-35 fighters and now attack-helicopter missile launchers — most of which remain unconfirmed as actual deliveries.
Sources
- Financial Times, “Russia agreed to supply Iran with missile launchers used in war on Ukraine,” November 5, 2026 — original investigation citing Vympel production documents obtained by Dallas Analytics.
- Army Recognition, “Russia’s Reported Missile Launcher Deal Highlights Potential Shift in Iran’s Mi-28 Helicopter Capabilities,” November 5, 2026 — technical detail on APU-L/APU-305 configurations and analyst caveats.
- Al Jazeera, “Rocket launcher deal illustrates deepening Russia-Iran relations,” November 6, 2026 — context on the Rezaei-Putin meeting and analyst commentary from Hanna Notte.
- Kyiv Post, “Russia to Supply Iran With 90 Helicopter-Mounted Missile Launchers Used in Ukraine War,” November 2026 — corroborating detail on Russia-Iran drone and intelligence-sharing history.
- Babel.ua, “FT: Iran signs secret €500m deal with Russia to refurbish air defense systems,” February 2026 — background on the separate Verba/9M336 air-defense refurbishment contract.
