China’s Liaoning Carrier Ran Area-Denial Drills, Taiwan Says

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Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said on November 10 that a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) task group built around the aircraft carrier Liaoning, together with naval formations from other PLA theater commands, had recently carried out “area-denial” training in the Western Pacific. Defence Minister Wellington Koo told reporters in Taipei the exercises threatened regional peace and stability, and said Taiwan would track the activity through joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance cooperation with partner countries, according to Taiwan’s Military News Agency and Reuters reporting. The claim followed a November 3 report that more than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels were at sea simultaneously across the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the wider Western Pacific in what Taipei called an unannounced exercise — one a U.S. think tank has assessed may be larger than any comparable PLA drill in 2025.

What Happened

Joseph Wu, secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, said on November 3 that more than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels were at sea simultaneously across the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the wider Western Pacific in what Taipei described as an unannounced exercise. Three days later, on November 6, the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW), publishing jointly with the American Enterprise Institute’s Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, assessed that the deployment could be larger in scale than the PLA’s “Justice Mission 2025” exercise and might represent an attempt to coordinate surface combatants from the Eastern, Northern and Southern Theater Commands into a single far-seas operation — a capability ISW linked to rehearsing the isolation of Taiwan. ISW also noted that the drill’s unannounced character was itself a likely signal, since Beijing has typically publicized large-scale exercises around Taiwan in the past.

China’s Ministry of National Defense had not issued a public response addressing the November assessments specifically as of this writing. Beijing has consistently described the Liaoning group’s Western Pacific deployments — including one the PLA Navy announced on October 14 as part of its “annual routine training plan” — as training “not directed at any specific country or target,” a line it has used for comparable deployments going back to 2025 and earlier in 2026.

Timeline of the Deployment

  • October 13–14: Japan’s Joint Staff Office observed the Liaoning in the East China Sea escorted by Type 055 destroyers; the PLA Navy announced the carrier group’s departure for the Western Pacific the same week, framing it as routine annual training.
  • Mid-October: The Liaoning group conducted flight operations in the Philippine Sea, passing near Okinawa days before the U.S.-Japan “Keen Sword” exercise, before turning toward the South China Sea — a leg Defense & Tech covered at the time.
  • November 3: Taiwan’s NSC Secretary-General Joseph Wu said more than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard ships were at sea region-wide in what he called an unannounced exercise.
  • November 6: ISW/AEI assessed the drill could exceed “Justice Mission 2025” in scale and might combine forces from three theater commands into one operation.
  • November 10: Taiwan’s Defence Ministry and Minister Koo publicly tied the Liaoning group to “area-denial” training; Taiwan also reported a rise in PLA aircraft sorties around the island over the preceding days.

Independent confirmation of the exercise’s full scope is limited. The 100-plus vessel figure comes from Taiwan’s government rather than from satellite imagery or a third-party tracker, and no outlet in this review found a Chinese statement directly addressing the “area-denial” characterization or the three-theater-command claim. Readers should treat the scale and intent described above as Taiwan’s and ISW’s assessment, not as an independently verified fact.

The Liaoning Carrier Group

Liaoning (hull number CV-16) is China’s first aircraft carrier, commissioned in 2012 after being rebuilt from the incomplete Soviet-era hull Varyag. It is a conventionally powered, ski-jump-launched (STOBAR) carrier homeported under the PLA Navy’s Northern Theater Command, typically embarking J-15 fighters and Z-18/Z-9 helicopters. Its strike groups normally sail with Type 055 Renhai-class destroyers and Type 901 fast combat support ships for logistics support on long-range deployments.

Within China’s three-carrier fleet, Liaoning is generally assessed as the least capable for sustained strike operations, serving primarily as a training and power-projection platform; the newer Shandong is based with the Southern Theater Command, while the electromagnetic-catapult carrier Fujian, commissioned in November 2025, is still working up and was not confirmed by any source in this review to have taken part in the November drills. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has assessed that Fujian requires further work before full operational status. Liaoning is not offered for export and has no foreign operators; it remains in exclusive PLA Navy service.

Regional Response and Context

Japan’s Joint Staff Office has tracked the Liaoning group’s movements through the East China Sea and Philippine Sea since mid-October, consistent with its routine practice of publishing surveillance photos of Chinese naval activity near Japanese waters. No U.S. government statement on the November drills specifically was identified in this review.

Analysts cited by the South China Morning Post framed the drills as part of a broader PLA effort to rehearse keeping U.S. and allied forces out of a future Taiwan Strait conflict — an anti-access/area-denial posture rather than a single-ship show of force. That reading is consistent with a pattern of escalating, larger PLA exercises around Taiwan since 2022, including “Joint Sword” and “Strait Thunder-2024A,” though analysts differ on how this November deployment compares in scale to those predecessors; ISW’s comparison point was specifically “Justice Mission 2025,” a 2025 PLA exercise.

The drills also come days after Chinese state media publicized new footage of the GJ-11 stealth drone’s weapons bay and a reported first flight of the GJ-21 stealth drone from the amphibious ship Sichuan, part of a broader run of PLA capability disclosures in late October and November rather than a single coordinated announcement tied to the carrier drills.

Why It Matters

If ISW’s reading holds up, the drills would mark a step toward the PLA demonstrating it can mass and coordinate surface forces from all three of its coastal theater commands — Eastern, Northern and Southern — in a single far-seas operation, rather than deploying one theater’s assets at a time. That matters strategically because an isolation or blockade scenario around Taiwan would require exactly this kind of cross-theater coordination. The unannounced nature of the exercise, a departure from Beijing’s recent practice of publicizing major Taiwan-adjacent drills in advance, is itself read by analysts as a deliberate signal: that the PLA can conduct such an operation with less warning than Taipei and its partners have come to expect.

For Taiwan, the practical response has been to lean on intelligence-sharing with partner countries rather than to contest the drills directly — a reminder of how much of Taipei’s defense posture depends on early warning rather than on matching PLA naval mass ship-for-ship. For the wider region, the episode underscores that Liaoning, despite being China’s oldest and least capable carrier, still has a clear role in signaling and coalition-building exercises even as Shandong and Fujian take on more of the PLA Navy’s frontline ambitions.

What Happens Next

No source reviewed for this article reported a fixed end date for the exercise or a scheduled Chinese government statement addressing Taiwan’s characterization of it. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said it would continue monitoring through joint ISR with partner countries, suggesting further disclosures are likely if PLA activity continues or expands. Any confirmation that Fujian has joined fleet operations, or a Chinese MND statement directly responding to the “area-denial” and three-theater-command characterizations, would be the next concrete developments to watch.

FAQ

What did Taiwan say about China’s Liaoning carrier group in November 2026?

Taiwan’s Defence Minister Wellington Koo said on November 10 that the Liaoning carrier group and naval formations from other PLA theater commands had conducted “area-denial” training in the Western Pacific, following a November 3 report that more than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels were at sea in an unannounced exercise.

Has China’s government responded to Taiwan’s claims?

Not specifically to the November “area-denial” characterization, as of this writing. Beijing has repeatedly described earlier Liaoning Western Pacific deployments, including the one it announced on October 14, as routine annual training not directed at any particular country.

How is this different from past Chinese exercises around Taiwan?

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War assessed that this deployment may combine naval forces from China’s Eastern, Northern and Southern Theater Commands into a single operation and judged it could be larger than the PLA’s 2025 “Justice Mission” exercise. It was also not announced in advance, unlike several major PLA drills around Taiwan since 2022.

Is the Liaoning aircraft carrier combat-capable?

Yes, but it is generally regarded as China’s least capable active carrier. Converted from an unfinished Soviet-era hull and commissioned in 2012, it uses an older ski-jump launch system and is mainly viewed as a training and power-projection platform rather than the PLA Navy’s primary strike carrier, a role increasingly associated with Shandong and the newer Fujian.

How many Chinese ships were reportedly involved?

Taiwan’s National Security Council said more than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels were at sea across the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea and Western Pacific around November 3. That figure describes the broader regional picture reported by Taipei, not a confirmed count for the Liaoning group specifically, and has not been independently verified by satellite imagery or third-party trackers in the sources reviewed.

Sources

  • Army Recognition, “Taiwan says China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier group practiced restricting naval access in Western Pacific,” Nov. 12, 2026 — primary account of Taiwan MND’s area-denial characterization. Link
  • Reuters via The China-Global South Project, “Taiwan Says China Is Conducting ‘Area Denial’ Drills in Western Pacific,” Nov. 10, 2026 — Minister Koo’s Nov. 10 and Nov. 5 remarks. Link
  • South China Morning Post, “PLA rehearsing operations to keep US forces out of Taiwan conflict,” Nov. 12, 2026 — analyst framing of the drills as an A2/AD rehearsal. Link
  • Maritime Executive, “Analysis: China’s Naval Drills Suggest Preparation to Isolate Taiwan,” Nov. 2026 — summary of the ISW/AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan assessment. Link
  • South China Morning Post, “Taiwan flags massive PLA naval mobilisation, spike in air sorties,” Nov. 2026 — Taiwan’s reporting on rising PLA aircraft activity. Link
  • CGTN, “PLA Navy sends Liaoning carrier to Western Pacific for training,” Oct. 14, 2026 — China’s own announcement and framing of the deployment as routine. Link

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